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RICKS v. STATE: BIG.BROTHER HAS ARRIVED
IN MARYLAND
In Ricks v. State' the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a
court-ordered surreptitious nonconsensual video surveillance and
the concomitant recording of conduct in a private place violates
neither the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act
(Maryland Act),2 nor the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution.3 Noting that in some respects the Maryland Act is
more restrictive than its federal counterpart,4 Title III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), 5 the
court of appeals rejected the appellants' claim that the Maryland Act
prohibits video surveillance. 6 Further, the court concluded that
video surveillance can be conducted under a search warrant issued
pursuant to Maryland's general search warrant statute.7
1. 312 Md. 11,537 A.2d 612 (1988). There were three appellants in Ricks: James
A. Ricks, Kevin R. DeShields, and Van Allen Lewis. Id.
2. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -413 (1984 & Supp. 1987); 312
Md. at 24, 537 A.2d at 618.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 312 Md. at 27-28, 537 A.2d at 620.
4. 312 Md. at 20, 537 A.2d at 616 ("it cannot be doubted ... that in some particu-
lars the Maryland Act is more stringent than its federal counterpart"). See also Gilbert, A
Diagnosis, Dissection, and Prognosis of Maryland's New Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Law, 8
U. BALT. L. REV. 183, 221 (1979).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III) was only part of a major revision
of federal criminal procedure enacted to contract the rulings of the Warren Court. The
Senate report indicates that Title III followed the report of the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice which itself was a response to the
perception of rising crime in America. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2112, 2154 [hereinafter S. REP. No.
1097] PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967). See generally F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED
WOUND (1970).
6. 312 Md. at 24, 537 A.2d at 618.
7. Id. at 30-31, 537 A.2d at 621. Maryland's search warrant statute provides:
(a) Whenever it be made to appear to any judge of any of the circuit courts
in the counties of this State, or to any judge of the District Court, by written
application signed and sworn to by the applicant, accompanied by an affidavit
or affidavits containing facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant or
affiants, that there is probable cause, the basis of which shall be set forth in said
affidavit or affidavits, to believe that any misdemeanor or felony is being com-
mitted by any individual or in any building, apartment, premises, place or thing
within the territorial jurisdiction of such judge, or that any property subject to
seizure under the criminal laws of the State is situated or located on the person
of any such individual or in or on any such building, apartment, premises, place
or thing, then the judge may forthwith issue a search warrant directed to any
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This note suggests that while Ricks arguably was correctly de-
cided, the decision was not the fail accompli the opinion suggests.
Relying on an analysis developed in a series of cases, the seminal
case being Torres v. United States,8 the court appears to marshal a for-
midable body of case law upholding the use of surreptitious video
surveillance by law enforcement agencies. Yet when the holdings
and reasoning of the Torres series are examined in light of their situ-
ational context, it becomes obvious that their conclusions are not
compelling. Because the court in Ricks declares them "well consid-
ered" 9 without analysis, the Ricks decision is called into question.
Further, when current fourth amendment analysis is applied to
Ricks, a problem appears with respect to how narrowly the surveil-
lance order was drawn.' ° Ultimately, in light of- the inherent
problems with video surveillance and the ease with which courts
have upheld its use, the field cries out for legislative guidance."
duly constituted policeman, or police officer authorizing him to search such
suspected individual, building, apartment, premises, place or thing, and to
seize any property found liable to seizure under the criminal laws of this State,
provided that any such search warrant shall name or describe, with reasonable
particularity, the individual, building, apartment, premises, place or thing to be
searched, the grounds for such search and the name of the applicant on whose
written application as aforesaid the warrant was issued, and provided further
that any search or seizure under the authority of such search warrant, shall be
made within 15 calendar days from the date of the issuance thereof and after
the expiration of the 15-day period said warrant shall be null and void.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551(a) (1987).
8. 751 F.2d 875, 884 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985) (district
court had authority to issue warrants authorizing video surveillance of a private place);
accord United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 195 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming without
discussing the government's use of electronic audio and video surveillance), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 3230 (1987); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir.) (holding
"that district courts, federal magistrates, and state judges may authorize television sur-
veillance of private premises in appropriate circumstances"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827
(1986).
9. 312 Md. at 24, 537 A.2d at 618.
10. See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
1i. The commentaries on video surveillance are replete with requests for legislative
action in the field. See, e.g., Comment, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Arrival of Big Brother?, 3 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 261, 298 (1976) (authored by
David P. Hodges) [hereinafter Big Brother] ("[Llegislation should be enacted to prohibit
the use of electronic visual surveillance techniques when such use intrudes upon an indi-
vidual's reasonable expectation of privacy from such surveillance."); Note, United States
v. Torres: The Need For Statutory Regulation of Video Surveillance, 12 J. LEGIs. 264, 264 (1985)
(authored by NancyJ. Montroy) [hereinafter Torres: Statutory Regulation] ("Congress and
the courts should control the use of new surveillance methods to prevent violations of
individuals' fourth amendment rights.").
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I. THE CASE
On June 8, 1984, the Baltimore City police and the federal
Drug Enforcement Administration applied to a Baltimore City cir-
cuit court judge for an order authorizing the use of audio and video
surveillance and recording devices in an ongoing investigation of an
illegal drug organization.' 2 The affidavit alleged that a Baltimore
City apartment13 was being.used as a "processing house" where
12. 312 Md. at 16, 537 A.2d at 614.
13. In particular, the apartment was leased by Ms. Laverne Pickney, a nonparty. As
reported by the court of appeals, the affidavit stated, "Laverne Pickney, did not reside
there; that she resided at another named address where her automobile was registered;
and neither she nor her motor vehicle was ever observed at or near the subject apart-
ment. The gas and electric and telephone services were listed in Pickney's name ......
Id. at 17-18, 537 A.2d at 615. These circumstances gave rise to another issue in the case:
did the appellants have standing to assert their fourth amendment claim of a reasonable
expectation of privacy? The appellants argued that they were invitees and the govern-
ment stipulated that they were in the apartment at the lessee's invitation. At the pretrial
suppression hearing, the court answered "yes." Id. at 19, 537 A.2d at 615. The inter-
mediate appellate court said "no." Ricks v. State, 70 Md. App. 287, 295, 520 A.2d 1136,
1140 (1987). The court of appeals noted that under current case law "mere presence in
another's apartment, without more, would not suffice to establish a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy[,] [but] (m]ore than mere presence.., is shown in this case[," the court
of appeals concluded, "we shall assume, without deciding, that the appellants had
Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search and seizure in this case." 312 Md.
at 27, 537 A.2d at 620.
The concept of standing focuses on whether the person seeking to challenge the
legality of a search as a basis for suppressing evidence was the actual victim of the search
or seizure. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The standing issue has
evolved through a long line of Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood,
108 S. Ct. 1625, 1627 (1988) (finding that defendants did not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in garbage placed outside the curtilage); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98, 104 (1980) (finding that appellant did not have a sufficient legitimate expectation of
privacy to contest the legality of a search of a purse where the search resulted in the
disclosure of illegal drugs which appellant had placed there); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 142 (1978) (declaring arcane distinctions of property law do not determine stand-
ing and finding proper analysis of whether search or seizure violated fourth amendment
turns on the question of "whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an in-
terest of the defendant which the fourth amendment was designed to protect"); Alder-
man v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969) (holding persons not parties to
unlawfully overheard conversations or who did not own premises where conversations
took place did not have standing to contest legality of surveillance, regardless of
whether they were targets of surveillance); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
491-92 (1963) ("Our holding.., that this ounce of heroin was inadmissible against Toy
does not compel a like result with respect to Wong Sun. The seizure of this heroin
invaded no right of privacy of person or premises which would entitle Wong Sun to
object to its use at his trial.").
The court of appeals said that "more than mere presence" was shown in the Ricks
case but assumed "without deciding the appellants had fourth amendment standing to
challenge the search and seizure in this case." Ricks, 312 Md. at 27, 537 A.2d at 620.
While
[tihe court's reluctance to address the more thorny "standing" issue is easily
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controlled dangerous substances (CDS) were "cut" and packaged
for street sale.' 4 Basing their knowledge on an extensive prelimi-
nary investigation, 5 the police officers asked the court to issue an
order for a single surreptitious entry to install both devices in order
to acquire the evidence needed to demonstrate probable cause to
arrest the organization's leaders. 6
The court granted the order upon finding that the application
complied with the requirements of Title III, the Maryland Act, and
the fourth amendment, along with the requisite probable cause to
believe that the CDS laws were being violated.' 7 After several weeks
of observation and twenty-five hours of recorded video tapes, a war-
understood and is not uncommon ... ,the "standing" question is a preliminary
one that should be resolved, for if appellant has no lawful right to contest the
respective searches, the question of their validity becomes moot. Putting the
cart before the horse may sometimes be easier to do, but it does make the
ultimatejourney considerably more difficult.
Graham v. State, 47 Md. App. 287, 290-91, 421 A.2d 1385, 1387 (1980), cert. denied, 290
Md. 715 (1981) (citation omitted). Because the Ricks court assumed the appellants had
standing and in light of the frequency with which the standing question is litigated, the
next case on this issue may be brought on standing grounds.
14. 312 Md. at 16, 537 A.2d at 614.
15. Id. at 17 n.4, 537 A.2d at 614 n.4. The police investigation is chronicled as
follows:
Pen registers were utilized; long distance telephone tolls and criminal history
records were monitored; various forms of mobile and fixed surveillance were
undertaken, as was use of contact and bumper beepers, attempts to obtain co-
defendant cooperation, to infiltrate the organization, to conduct a grand jury
investigation, to the issuance of search warrants, and other investigative
methods.
Id.
16. Id. at 17, 537 A.2d at 614-15. The elements of probable cause have been de-
scribed as follows:
Basic to search warrant protections is the requirement of probable cause. Its
function is to guarantee a substantial probability that the invasion involved in
the search will be justified by discovery of offending items. Two conclusions
necessary to the issuance of the warrant must be supported by substantial evi-
dence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected
with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be
searched.
Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U.
Cui. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court described the
evils sought to be avoided by the probable cause requirement as follows:
The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history. The
general warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested was left blank,
and the writs of assistance, against which James Otis inveighed, both perpetu-
ated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on sus-
picion. Police control took the place of judicial control, since no showing of
"probable cause" before a magistrate was required.
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
17. 312 Md. at 18, 537 A.2d at 615.
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rant was issued to search the apartment."8 The police discovered
and seized both heroin and cocaine and arrested the appellants.' 9
Charged with possession and intent to manufacture and dis-
tribute heroin and cocaine, the appellants moved to suppress the
evidence gained through the video surveillance.2" Appellants as-
serted two defenses: that the video surveillance was an illegal
search and seizure under the fourth amendment and that it was pre-
cluded by the Maryland Act. 2' Arguing that the Maryland Act was
more restrictive than Title III, the appellants claimed "it was the
public policy of this State to place greater restrictions on video sur-
veillance than on . . . [the] less intrusive wire and oral
communications."22
18. Id. "[O]fficers entered the air ducts of the apartment through the roof, shaved
away part of the dry wall and implanted a miniature camera, focused on the dining room
of the apartment." Id.
19. Id. Police arrested Ricks and DeShields in the Pickney apartment and, shortly
thereafter, arrested Lewis who had fled when the police entered. Id.
20. Id, at 18-19, 537 A.2d at 615. The exclusionary rule was first postulated in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914):
The effect of the fourth amendment is to put the courts of the United States
and federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limita-
tion and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to for-
ever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law.
d. at 391.
Historically, the exclusionary rule has been the subject of much debate. See Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (holding that exclusionary rule does not apply in pros-
ecution for a state crime); but see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (overruling
Wolf and holding the exclusionary rule applies in state prosecutions).
More recently, the Court has narrowed its scope. See Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Servs. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (followingjanis, infra, exclu-
sionary rule not applicable in civil deportation hearings); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984) (announcing good faith exception to exclusionary rule where
police act pursuant to a search warrant); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28
(1980) (exclusionary rule does not apply to impeach testimony); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (limiting use of exclusionary rule in collateral federal proceed-
ings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (evidence unlawfully obtained in
good faith by state criminal law enforcement officials and turned over to federal officials
need not be excluded in federal tax proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 350-52 (1974) (holding purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police
conduct, not to redress injury to the privacy of the searched victim, and therefore the
exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence presented to a grand jury). See generally 1
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 313-17 (12th ed. 1975 & Supp. 1987).
For an interesting look at the exclusionary rule set against a historical backdrop see
generally A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 235-49 (1987).
21. 312 Md. at 18-19, 537 A.2d at 615.
22. Id. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Maryland
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act (Maryland Act). The court stated in its
opinion that "considerations of public policy, with obvious Orwellian overtones-those
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At the pretrial suppression hearing, the court found that the
Maryland Act did not regulate video surveillance and therefore con-
cluded that such surveillance was not prohibited.13 At trial, the ap-
pellants were convicted of the offenses charged.24 Both the court of
special appeals2 5 and court of appeals2 6 upheld the conviction.
In this case of first impression, ChiefJudge Murphy, writing for
the court of appeals, declared that the central issue was whether
video surveillance is permissible under the Maryland Act and if so,
whether the surveillance violated the appellants' fourth amendment
rights. 27 The court examined several federal court decisions28 and a
New York state court decision 29 rejecting the theory that the appli-
cable audio surveillance act regulated video surveillance and held
that the Maryland Act did not prohibit video surveillance.30 While
assuming, without deciding, that the appellants had fourth amend-
ment standing to challenge the search and seizure,3 1 the court de-
clined to find a fourth amendment violation.32 Following the
criteria employed by other jurisdictions as to the appropriate stan-
dard of reasonableness in a fourth amendment review of video sur-
of Big Brother watching-are fully evident in this case ...." 312 Md. at 20, 537 A.2d at
616.
23. 312 Md. at 19, 537 A.2d at 615.
24. d., 537 A.2d at 616.
25. Ricks v. State, 70 Md. App. 287, 520 A.2d 1136 (1987). Affirming the appellants'
convictions, the intermediate appellate court found "the appellants did not meet the
burden of demonstrating a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises,
and none of their fourth amendment rights were violated." Id. at 295, 520 A.2d at 1140.
By squarely answering the standing question, this opinion distinguished itself from the
court of appeals' opinion.
At the intermediate appellate court level the appellants asserted several subsidiary
errors: (1) the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury regarding the element of
specific intent for the crime of possession with intent to manufacture heroin and co-
caine, (2) the admissibility into evidence of an opinion identifying the individuals on the
videotape, and (3) the admissibility into evidence of a nonexpert's opinion concerning
the identity of several weapons. Id. at 291, 520 A.2d at 1138.
26. Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 1i, 537 A.2d 612 (1988).
27. Id. at 13, 537 A.2d at 612. But see Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520, 539, 292 A.2d
728, 745 (1972) (where Maryland Court of Special Appeals visited issue of video surveil-
lance prior to enactment of Maryland wiretap statute), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 977 (1973).
28. See cases cited supra note 8. See also In re Order Authorizing Interception of Oral
Communications & Videotape Surveillance, 513 F. Supp. 421, 423 (D. Mass. 1980)
(video surveillance permitted only when determined by audio surveillance alone that
illegal activities within the scope of the order were taking place).
29. )People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 642, 422 N.E.2d 506, 507, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846,
847 (1981) (video surveillance does not violate fourth amendment rights).
30. 312 Md. at 24, 537 A.2d at 618.
31. Id. at 27, 537 A.2d at 620. See supra note 13 for a discussion of standing.
32. 312 Md. at 27-28, 537 A.2d at 620.
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veillance," the court utilized four elements of the Maryland audio
surveillance statute 4 and found that the order was in conformity
with these requirements.3 5 On this basis, the court held that the
video surveillance in Ricks complied with the search and seizure re-
quirements of the fourth amendment.3 6
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment
Two conflicting policies meet in the fourth amendment: the
right of the people to be free from governmental intrusion and soci-
ety's need for effective law enforcement.37 The framers of the
amendment carefully grafted these two policies: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
33. Id. at 29, 537 A.2d at 620. The basic purpose of the fourth amendment is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions of govern-
ment. The fourth amendment balances the reasonable need for the search against the
resulting intrusion. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (the
standard to guide a magistrate in the issuance of search warrants for administrative
searches, e.g., fire, health, housing, will vary necessarily with the municipal program be-
ing enforced).
34. 312 Md. at 29, 537 A.2d at 620-21. The four elements of the Maryland Wiretap-
ping and Electronic Surveillance statute are: necessity, particularity, duration, and mini-
mization. See MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(c)(3), (d)(l)(iii), (e) (1984 &
Supp. 1987).
35. 312 Md. at 29-30, 537 A.2d at 621. The court was generous in finding that the
order met the statutory prerequisites of the Maryland Act. Except for saying, inter alia,
that the police and Judge Allen "were cognizant of these requirements" and that "ap-
proximately forty-nine pages of the application detailed why conventional law enforce-
ment techniques were inadequate in solving the case," the court really does not analyze
the order. Id. For example, in light of the strict minimization requirements imposed by
the Maryland Act, why were 25 hours of video surveillance necessary? Did the 27-day
extension of the surveillance correlate to some need for evidence in this case? If it did,
what was that need?
36. Id. at 30-31, 537 A.2d at 621.
37. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967). The goal of the fourth amendment
was stated as follows:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting). See also I
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE-A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.1 (1978
& Supp. 1986) ("[t]he essence of the Fourth Amendment has never been better stated
than in .. .Olmstead v. United States."); Big Brother, supra note 11, at 263.
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against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
... 38 Thus, the policies underlying the fourth amendment are
forever bound in uneasy balance resting upon a judicial determina-
tion of reasonableness. The courts have wrestled with this tension,
especially as it is manifested through governmental electronic
snooping. 9
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality
of surreptitious video surveillance, the Supreme Court, in Berger v.
New York 4" and Katz v. United States,4 has considered both the rea-
sonable use of electronic aural surveillance by law enforcement
agencies and the warrant requirements necessary for such surveil-
lance. Briefly, the Court explicitly held that the use of electronic
devices to surreptitiously monitor conversations was within the am-
bit of fourth amendment protections.4" Also, the Court fashioned a
two-part test to determine when governmental aural surveillance
constitutes a search and seizure. First, the individual under surveil-
lance must have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy; and
second, that expectation must be objectively reasonable.4"
In addition to the reasonable expectation of privacy standard,
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). The amendment continues "and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Id.
39. Big Brother, supra note 11, at 269-75.
40. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Berger the Supreme Court held that the New York State
Wiretap Statute, N. Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 700.05 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988), was
"too broad," and hence unconstitutional, in permitting (I) the installation and opera-
tion of surveillance equipment for 60 days upon a single showing of probable cause; (2)
the renewal of the order without a present showing of probable cause; and (3) the issu-
ance of an order without a termination date. 388 U.S. at 59-60.
41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, which enunciated the current constitutional test,
the Supreme Court held that the recording of the petitioner's telephone conversation.
by attaching an electronic listening device to the outside of a telephone booth, was an
illegal search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 353. The
Court declared that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," id. at 351,
and that "wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know he will remain safe from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures." Id. at 359.
42. Id. at 353. See also Berger, 388 U.S. at 63.
43. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's concurring opin-
ion is the classic statement of the constitutional requirement.
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people.
Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a "place."
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (sub-
jective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."
442 [VOL. 48:435
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the Court outlined the requisite elements of a warrant authorizing
electronic aural surveillance." The four constitutionally mandated
requirements are particularity,45 duration,46 minimization, 47 and ne-
cessity.48 These requirements must be strictly construed. 9 In con-
sidering the validity of Title III in relation to these requirements,
the Maryland Court of Appeals stated in 1972 that to allow aural
surveillance "without the strictest of controls would utterly destroy
the basis of this nation's existence." 50
44. Berger, 388 U.S. at 55-60. In addition to the form standards, see infra notes 45-48,
in order to obtain a warrant, the Constitution requires a finding of probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, by a neutral and detached magistrate. 388 U.S. at 54-55.
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473 (fourth amendment prohibits State
Attorney General from issuing search warrants), reh 'g denied, 404 U.S. 674 (197 1); John-
son v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (requiring detached magistrate to authorize
search). But see Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 347 (1972) (permitting issu-
ance of arrest warrant by clerk of municipal court). Seegenerally Connally v. Georgia, 429
U.S. 245, 251 (1977) (per curiam) (holding magistrate is not neutral and detached where
receipt of fee accompanies only affirmative responses to a warrant request); Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1975) (holding that once a warrantless arrest is made,
fourth amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause).
45. Berger, 388 U.S. at 55-58. Particularity not only refers to the fourth amendment
command that a warrant may be issued only upon a finding of probable cause but also
must "particularly [describe] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." Id. The Berger Court criticized the New York wiretap statute for its lack of par-
ticularity. Id. at 58. See also Big Brother, supra note 11, at 282-83.
46. Berger, 388 U.S. at 59. Duration refers to the length of time a search can con-
tinue; for example, "authorization of eavesdropping for a two-month period is the
equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing
of probable cause." Id. See also Big Brother, supra note 11, at 283-84.
47. Berger, 388 U.S. at 59-60. Minimization refers to drawing narrowly the warrant
authorization so that only those conversations which are connected with the subject of
the investigation are intercepted. Id. See also Big Brother, supra note 11. at 284-88.
48. Berger, 388 U.S. at 60. Necessity refers to the lack of alternative investigative
techniques open to the law enforcement agency to obtain the information. Id. See also
Big Brother, supra note 11, at 288-89.
49. Berger, 388 U.S. at 56.
By its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on the privacy that is
broad in scope .... [T]he "indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforce-
ment raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments," and imposes "a heavier responsibility on this Court in its supervision
of the fairness of procedures .... "
Id (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329 n.7 (1966)) (citation omitted).
See also State v. Bailey, 289 Md. 143, 151-54, 422 A.2d 1021, 1026-28 (1980) (evidence
held properly suppressed when ex parte court order, authorizing wiretap, failed to pro-
vide a directive to terminate the wiretap operation upon attainment of objective); State
v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 274, 292 A.2d 86, 95-96 (1972) (holding that a failure of wiretap
order to contain statements complying with constitutionally mandated requirements
caused the order and subsequent renewals to be void).
50. Siegel, 266 Md. at 260-61, 292 A.2d at 89. See generally Adair & Archer, Electronic
Surveillance, 76 GEo. L.J. 626 (1988); Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping:
The Politics of "Law and Order, " 67 MICH. L. REV. 455 (1969); Goldstock & Chananie,
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B. The Statutes
Partially in reaction to the Berger and Katz decisions, Congress
enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.1'
Title III of the Act prohibits the nonconsensual interception of wire
or oral communications by the use of electronic devices except
when the law enforcement activity carefully follows the prescribed
criteria.52 Title III was designed to provide a uniform minimum na-
tional standard governing electronic interception of wire and oral
communications.5" Title III is not self-executing as applied to the
"Criminal" Lawyers: The Use of Electronic Surveillance and Search Warrants in the Investigation
and Prosecution of Attorneys Suspected of Criminal Wrongdoing, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1855 (1988);
Note, Electronic Eavesdropping: Which Conversations Are Protected From Interception?, 7 U.
HAW. L. REV. 227 (1985) (authored by Cindy S. Ikenaga).
51. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 5, at 2112. Prior to the enactment of Title III,
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 regulated the interception of
communications. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982, Supp. 111 1985 & Supp. IV 1986). It provided
that "no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication
and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person .... ." Id. The statute was upheld by the
Court. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (extending exclusionary
rule to leads secured by illegal wiretaps); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 327
(1939) (declaring § 605 covered intrastate telephone calls); Nardone v. United States,
302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (holding § 605 prohibited federal officers from testifying in
federal court as to evidence gained through illegal wiretap). But see Schwartz v. Texas,
344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952) (wiretap evidence gained in violation of § 605 admissible in
state court).
As for "bugging," prior to Berger-Katz the Supreme Court held evidence gained
through an unauthorized physical invasion of the defendant's premises was inadmissi-
ble. See Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158 (1964) (evidence gained by spike mike
inadmissible); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (same). But see
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 122 (1942) (permitting admission of evidence
gained by dictaphone attached to wall). See generally Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 439 (1963) (holding no eavesdropping occurred where an internal revenue agent
recorded a conversation offering a bribe); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751
(1952) (concluding that, absent a trespass, a wired-for-sound informant did not violate
fourth amendment).
Through this judicial activism, the Federal Bureau of Investigation crime statistics
began to rise. F. GRAHAM, supra note 5, at I1. Moreover, the American community per-
ceived that the courts were protecting criminals to the detriment of the law-abiding citi-
zen. Id. Law and order, with its racial overtones, became an important issue in the 1968
presidential election. See id. at 12-15; D. KEARNS, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM 307-08 (1976). See generally R. HARRIS, THE FEAR OF CRIME (1969). Against this
backdrop, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was enacted in 1968. 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
52. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 5, at 2153-54. The declared purpose of Title Ill was
"to combat organized crime." Id. at 2157. But in crafting carefully the prescribed crite-
ria, Title III recognized that the rapid advancement in the technology of electronic sur-
veillance offered a boom, especially in the area of mutual security, and a danger to a
democratic society. Id at 2156-57.
53. Id. at 2153. See Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 13-14, 537 A.2d 612, 613 (1988).
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states and requires a state act to be no less restrictive than the fed-
eral counterpart.54 Maryland enacted just such a statute in 1973. 53
The Maryland Act was fashioned to comply with Title III,
although generally it is observed that the Maryland Act provides
greater freedom from surreptitious electronic surveillance. 56 None-
theless, there are several very significant differences between the
two acts.5" First, the Maryland Act broadens the definition of oral
communications to include a greater class of communications. 58
Second, the Maryland Act prohibits interception unless all parties to
the communication consent.59 Third, the Maryland courts have re-
quired strict compliance with the requirements of section 10-408 of
the Maryland Act.' This section requires a showing that normal
investigative procedures have failed or will not succeed.6 1 In con-
trast, some federal courts merely require substantial compliance to
the federal counterpart.6"
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
55. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -413 (1984 & Supp. 1987).
56. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 221. Interestingly, the author of this article was also the
author of the intermediate appellate court's opinion in Ricks v. State, 70 Md. App. 287,
520 A.2d 1136 (1987).
57. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 192. Judge Gilbert's commentary outlines a number
of differences in substance and style between the Maryland Act and Title Ill, only a few
of which are applicable to this note. The appellants utilized these differences as a basis
for their argument that although the courts had already declared that Title III did not
cover video surveillance, the Maryland Act did. Ricks, 312 Md. at 23-24, 537 A.2d at
619. The appellants, however, failed to explain which differences they were relying
upon. Id. Appropriately, the court refused to guess.
58. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 192. See also MD. CTs. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-
401(2) (1984 & Supp. 1987).
59. Gilbert, supra note 4. at 194. See also MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-
402(c)(3) (1984 & Supp. 1987).
60. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408 (1984 & Supp. 1987). "The statute
sets up a strict procedure that must be followed and we will not abide any deviation, no
matter how slight, from the prescribed path." State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 274, 292
A.2d 86, 95 (1972) (emphasis in original).
61. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(a)(3) (1984 & Supp. 1987).
62. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 205-07. In United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 523
(1974), for example, the Court held that an authorization by the Attorney General's
Executive Assistant did not comply with Title 1Il. In particular, the Court found both a
failure to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(b)(v), which requires the government to in-
clude in a wiretap application the names of all persons whom it has probable cause to
believe are engaged in the criminal activity under investigation and whose conversation
it expects to intercept, and 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d), which requires the government to
furnish the judge with a description of the classes of persons whose conversations have
been intercepted. Although evidence obtained in violation of the statute was sup-
pressed in Giordano, the Court found that a statutory violation does not necessitate ex-
clusion of the evidence obtained by the wiretap.
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C. Case Law
The federal courts considering this issue uniformly have held
that Title III does not apply to video surveillance and have permit-
ted the use of this surveillance.63 For example, in a memorandum
supporting the authorization of a surreptitious entry into a private
place for the implantation of electronic audio and video surveillance
devices, Judge Keeton for the Federal District Court of Massachu-
setts concluded that Title III is not "formally applicable to video
surveillance."'
Similarly, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Torres
v. United States,65 held that a district court has the authority to issue
warrants authorizing video surveillance of a private place.66 In
Torres, a terrorist organization allegedly was assembling bombs; the
warrants authorizing the video surveillance of this activity were held
to be permissible under the fourth amendment.6 ' The decision re-
lied on the inherent power of a court of general jurisdiction to issue
search warrants and a broad reading of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure6" as applied by the Supreme Court in United
63. See cases cited supra note 8.
64. In re Order Authorizing Interception of Oral Communications & Videotape Sur-
veillance, 513 F. Supp. 421, 423 (D. Mass. 1980). In this well-reasoned memorandum,
Judge Keeton struck the proper balance between an individual's rights to be free from
government intrusion and law enforcement and the need to protect the community. In
granting the application, the court directed the agents implementing the surveillance to
employ the strictest minimization possible. Id. Video surveillance was permitted only
when it was determined by audio surveillance alone that illegal activities within the
scope of the order were taking place. Id. Further, the duration of the video surveillance
was subject to the same constraints as imposed under Title III. Id. Assuming that an
order authorizing video surveillance ever is permissible without legislative sanction, this
was the only sensible alternative.
65. 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985).
66. Id. at 884.
67. Id.
68. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part:
(a) Authority to Issue Warrant. A search warrant authorized by this rule
may be issued by a federal magistrate or a judge of a state court of record
within the district wherein the property or person sought is located, upon re-
quest of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government.
(b) Property or Persons Which May Be Seized With a Warrant. A warrant
may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any (1) property that
constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense; or (2) contraband,
the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or (3) property
designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the means of
committing a criminal offense; or (4) person for whose arrest there is probable
cause, or who is unlawfully restrained.
(c) Issuance and Contents.
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States v. New York Telephone CO. 6 9 Judge Cudahy, in his concurring
opinion, criticized the Torres majority's reasoning.7 ° Although con-
curring in the result, he construed Title III in light of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)7 ' and found express
statutory authorization for video surveillance."2 He concluded that
tying Title III to FISA "avoids the majority's anomaly of subjecting
the most dangerously intrusive form of electronic surveillance" to
the least restrictive oversight."'
(1) Warrant upon Affidavit .... If the federal magistrate or state
judge is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or that there is
probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue a warrant identify-
ing the property or person to be seized and naming or describing the per-
son or place to be searched.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a), (b), (c)(1).
69. 434 U.S. 159 (1977). In New York Tel. Co., the Court determined that the use of a
pen register, an electronic device used to record dialed telephone numbers, is not an
interception of oral or wire communications under Title III because the telephone com-
pany routinely records such information for billing purposes. Id. at 165-68. See also FED.
R. CRIM. P. 41(b). "Pen registers do not 'intercept' because they do not acquire the
.contents' of the communication, as that term is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). Indeed,
a law enforcement official could not ever determine from the use of a pen register
whether a communication existed. These devices do not hear sound." New York Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. at 167. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that the
use of a pen register is not governed by fourth amendment). See generally Note, Installa-
tion and Use of a Pen Register Does Not Constitute a Fourth Amendment Search, 38 MD. L. REV.
767 (1979).
70. Tones v. United States, 751 F.2d 875, 886-95 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J., con-
curring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985).
71. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1811 (West Supp. 1988). See generally Giesy, jurisdictional
Limitations on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 8 SUFrOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 259
(1984); Note, The Constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 36 VAND.
L. REV. 231 (1983) (authored byJ. Anderson); Note, A Constitutional Test for Foreign Elec-
tronic Intelligence Surveillance, 8 N.C. J. lrr'L L. & COM. REG. 77 (1982) (authored by T.
Lischer); Reazer, Needed Weapons in the Army's War on Drugs: Electronic Surveillance and Infor-
mants, 116 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1987).
72. 751 F.2d at 887. Judge Cudahy urged that Title III and FISA "are written to
impose a comprehensive regulatory scheme on the use of electronic surveillance in the
United States whenever there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Title III was en-
acted to govern domestic surveillance activity, and ... expressly exempted from its pro-
visions, electronic surveillance for national security purposes." Id. at 887-88. "FISA
repealed the [national security] exemption and declared that the executive branch does
not have inherent authority to undertake electronic surveillance even in national security
and counterintelligence cases." Id. at 888. "FISA makets] it unmistakably clear that
government (federal, state and local) may not use lightly intrusive forms of electronic
surveillance unless it does so in accordance with either Title III or FISA." Id. Judge
Cudahy further interpreted FISA's definition of electronic surveillance as broad enough
to cover video surveillance and declared "if the video surveillance in this case was not
expressly authorized by either Title III or FISA, then it would be prohibited by law." Id.
at 889.
73. Id. at 895. Judge Cudahy concluded, "[M]y approach subjects this highly intru-
sive form of surveillance to at least as much constraint as less intrusive forms are subject
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In 1986 the Second Circuit decided two cases relying on the
reasoning of Torres: United States v. Biasucci 74 and United States v. Ian-
niello." In Biosucci the defendants appealed their convictions on var-
ious counts of extortion and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) violations arising out of a loansharking
operation. 6 They alleged that court-ordered visual and aural sur-
veillance was improper because there was no statutory authority for
such surveillance and thus the fruits of such surveillance should be
suppressed. 77 "Finding the reasoning of Torres to be compelling,"
the court joined the Seventh Circuit and held "that district courts,
federal magistrates, and state judges may authorize television sur-
veillance of private premises in appropriate circumstances. "78
In lanniello the defendants appealed their convictions for viola-
tions of RICO, mail fraud, and tax evasion. 79 The defendants al-
leged that the government's evidence, which was derived from
electronic audio and video surveillance, should be suppressed. The
court affirmed the convictions without discussing these contentions,
finding them to be without merit."0
In addition to these federal cases, state courts have upheld
to, and it accords with the general congressional design of closely regulating-prohibit-
ing--these somewhat awesome forms of surveillance." Id.
74. 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986). The defendants in
Biasucci devised a scheme that attracted customers with credit problems through offers
of legitimate financing. Once baited, the customers were told that the advertized funds
currently were not available but that emergency funds at interest rates of 1.5 to 57 per
week were. As part of the scheme the customers were required to sign documents con-
cealing the actual interest rates. Id. at 506.
75. 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986), cerl. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3230 (1987). The defendants
in lanniello operated restaurants and bars through front companies in order to skim from
the income receipts. In so doing, they failed to report the total income to state and
federal taxing authorities, falsified statements in support of applications for liquor
licenses from the New York State Liquor Authority and made false statements before the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. Id at 186-88.
76. 786 F.2d at 506. In addition to the claims of error based on the video surveil-
lance, the defendants argued (1) that misconduct on the part of the prosecutor deprived
them of a fair trial; (2) that the trial court erroneously charged the jury on the state of
mind the government had to prove to establish the "collection of unlawful debt"; and
(3) that the imposition of consecutive, as opposed to concurrent, sentences violated the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. Id.
77. Id. at 507.
78. Id. at 509.
79. 808 F.2d at 186.
80. Id. Unlike the appellate court, the district court's opinion provides a plethora of
analysis of the electronic surveillance. United States v. lanniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455,
1460-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Nevertheless, because the federal courts construing Title Ill
permit substantial compliance, id. at 1461, rather than the strict compliance required by
the Maryland courts interpreting the Maryland' Act, see supra note 60, the lannitllo lower
court opinion is inapposite to Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 537 A.2d 612 (1988).
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court-ordered video surveillance."' In People v. Teicher"2 a dentist
was ultimately convicted of sexual abuse by evidence gained
through video surveillance. New York's highest court dismissed the
dentist's contention that the warrant was improper without express
statutory authority and found that the video surveillance did not vio-
late his fourth amendment rights.8 3
III. ANALYSIS
While courts have variously described electronic eavesdropping
and the interception of oral communications as "Orwellian,"8 4
"Frankenstein's monster,"8 5 and "the greatest of all invasions of
81. See, e.g., Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 (1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 977 (1973). In Avery the court upheld a conviction for assault and battery where a
doctor was observed on closed-circuit television touching the breast of his patient. Id. at
527, 292 A.2d at 735. The doctor advanced seven issues relating to the television moni-
tored evidence and the court rejected them all. The court found that the Katz rational
did not apply in this case because the doctor, while at the victim's house, did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 539, 292 A.2d at 743. The court found that the
police's failure to procure antecedent judicial authority prior to the interception did not
violate MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A (1987 & Supp. 1988), a statute prohibiting audio
surveillance without the consent of the parties, because the statute regulated audio, not
video, surveillance. 15 Md. App. at 542-43, 292 A.2d at 744. Furthermore, the court
held that the failure of the State to record the video did not make the testimony of the
State's witnesses, who actually viewed the monitor, secondary evidence, nor was their
testimony hearsay. Id. at 544-45, 292 A.2d at 745. The court dismissed the doctor's
claim that by not recording the evidence, the State in effect made him a victim of com-
pulsory self-incrimination as "frivolous and without merit." Id. at 545, 292 A.2d at 745.
The court refused to read MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 555B (1987), which requires the
Attorney General to approve the monitoring of a telephone conversation, as a restric-
tion on video monitoring. 15 Md. App. at 545-46, 292 A.2d at 745. Finally, the court
refused to hold that the lack of a recording was tantamount to a suppression of exculpa-
tory evidence by the State. Id. at 546, 292 A.2d at 746. See also Sponick v. Detroit Police
Dep't, 49 Mich. App. 162, 198, 211 N.W.2d 674, 690 (1973) (holding Title IlI not appli-
cable to photographic surveillance and that defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in a public tavern).
82. 52 N.Y.2d 638, 422 N.E.2d 506, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1981). In Teicher the police
initiated an investigation after two female patients complained of a male dentist's sexual
advances toward them while they were under the influence of anesthesia. After numer-
ous unsuccessful efforts to obtain additional evidence, police placed a video camera in
the dentist's office to monitor his treatment of patients who had consented to the video
taping. A policewoman was enlisted as a decoy. Id. at 642-45, 422 N.E.2d at 507-09,
439 N.Y.S.2d at 847-49.
83. Id. at 642, 422 N.E.2d at 507, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
84. See Big Brother, supra note I1, at 261. See also G. ORWELL, 1984 (1961).
85. State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 257, 292 A.2d 86, 87 (1972). Judge Digges' color-
ful language places this subject in perspective:
This case points up the great problems both legal and moral that we must again
ponder in the wake of mankind's continuing scientific advancement-an ad-
vancement that staggers the imagination with its potential for good but causes
us pause for fear that we may create "Frankenstein's" monster and be unable to
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 48:435
privacy," 86 they and the legislature nevertheless allow it as a permis-
sible investigative tool of law enforcement. And while courts have
remarked that video surveillance is "extraordinarily intrusive"87 and
that "[i]t cannot be doubted ... that video surveillance is more in-
trusive than audio surveillance,"8 8 the Maryland Court of Appeals
upheld a court-ordered nonconsensual surreptitious video surveil-
lance without express legislative sanction.8 9 Although the result
may be correct, Ricks' analysis is built upon a house of cards.
A. Incorrect Reliance on Persuasive Case Law
Citing Torres and its progeny90 for authority contravening the
appellants' position that the Maryland Act's silence on video surveil-
lance means that the legislature has precluded its use,9 ' the court
declares video surveillance appropriate without providing further
analysis. The court stated, "We think the federal cases are well con-
sidered and, notwithstanding the differences in several provisions
between the two laws, it is clear that the Maryland Act, like Title III,
reaches only oral and wire communications and does not regulate
video surveillance.- 9 2
channel its growth. This is not a new or even a unique quandary but one which
most recently came into sharp focus with the advent of the atomic age. Nuclear
energy offers the promise of relief to a large portion of the earth's population
by alleviating such pressing problems as famine and plague but it also portends
the very real menace of total destruction because of the weaponry it has pro-
duced. The industrialization of most of the world, while offering a life style
unparalleled in the history of civilization, has also polluted much of nature's
beauty and threatens to contaminate the very air we breathe. This same dichot-
omy applies to the development of electronic equipment.
Id. (footnote omitted). Strangely, this language, which appears to an hyperbole, is
frankly quite restrained in light of a recent court of special appeals decision. See
Schochet v. State, 75 Md. App. 314, 541, A.2d 183, cert. granted, 313 Md. 637, 547 A.2d
201 (1988) (holding a statute prohibiting unnatural and perverted sexual practices not
to violate constitutional rights to privacy when applied to private act of fellatio between
consenting, unmarried, heterosexual adults). Synthesizing Schoheiw in light of Ricks,
Judge Wilner observed in dissent, "If the police can install a camera in the dining room,
why not in the bedroom? The requisite probable cause is not that hard to come by." Id.
at 360 n.2, 541 A.2d at 205 n.2.
86. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (Douglas,J., concurring).
87. In re Order Authorizing Interception of Oral Communications & Videotape Sur-
veillance, 513 F. Supp. 421, 422 (D. Mass. 1980).
88. Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 20, 537 A.2d 612, 616 (1988).
89. Id. at 30-31, 537 A.2d at 621.
90. See cases cited supra note 8.
91. 312 Md. at 21-23, 537 A.2d at 616-19. The court also cited In re Order Authoriz-
ing Interception of Oral Communications & Videotape Surveillance, 513 F. Supp. 421
(D. Mass. 1980).
92. 312 Md. at 24, 537 A.2d at 618.
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On closer examination, the federal cases are distinguishable
from Ricks and, with the exception of Torres, it is questionable
whether they are "well considered." In Torres a terrorist organiza-
tion was allegedly constructing bombs in a safe house.93 The wan-
ton destruction which would have been visited upon innocent
bystanders had they completed their heinous work provided the
most compelling case for a judicially sanctioned order permitting
video surveillance without express legislative authority. 94 A drug
conspiracy, such as the one in Ricks, despicable as it is, simply does
not rise to the level of immediate and indiscriminate harm as a
bomb placed in a bus station or airport.
In addition, Biasucci and lanniello are of questionable author-
ity. 95 These cases involved, respectively, loansharking and mail
fraud. Even though both of these crimes are serious, they do not
involve the type of potential societal harm found in the circum-
stances of Torres. For that reason alone, Torres is not proper author-
ity and video surveillance should not have been permitted without
prior legislative approval. Further, both cases relied upon Torres'
reasoning for their analysis rather than weighing law enforcement's
need for video surveillance against the constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 96 In fact, Ianniello af-
firmed the district court's holding on video surveillance issue with-
out any analysis of this issue.97 Thus, Biasucci and lanniello provide
little guidance to the court's decision in Ricks.
The Ricks court further relied on Teicher "as instructive on the
point"9' that video surveillance is not regulated by an aural surveil-
lance statute. Teicher, however, cannot be used to support a holding
authorizing nonconsensual video surveillance; that is, in Teicher the
93. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 876 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1087 (1985).
94. Id. at 887.
95. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
96. See United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
827 (1986). The Biasucci court said, "Finding the reasoning in Torres to be compelling,
we join the Seventh Circuit and hold that district courts .. .may authorize television
surveillance of private premises in appropriate circumstances." Id.
97. United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 186 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 3230 (1987). The lanniello court said:
We affirm, and discuss only the questions concerning the construction of the
indictment, the definition of a pattern of racketeering activity under [RICO]
... the elements of mail fraud .... the effect of the twenty-first amendment on
the federal government's ability to regulate the mails, and the corroboration
necessary to convict on a co-conspirator's statement.
Id. (citation omitted).
98. Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 24, 537 A.2d 612, 618 (1988).
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victim was an undercover policewoman who consented to the sur-
veillance." Had this been merely an aural surveillance in Maryland,
and not the more intrusive video surveillance, the consent of only
one party would not have been enough to meet the strictures of the
Maryland Act.'0° Nonetheless, there was no consenting party in
Ricks and thus Teicher should provide no instruction whatsoever to
any court considering facts like those found in Ricks.
B. Minimization
Video surveillance is different in kind, and not merely in de-
gree, from audio surveillance. Because the Ricks decision creates
the anomaly of the most dangerously intrusive form of electronic
surveillance being subject to the least scrutiny, only the gravest of
circumstances can justify it.' 0 ' The Torres court recognized that
video surveillance is more invasive of privacy than audio surveil-
lance, "just as a strip search is more invasive than a pat-down search
... 102 , Thus, only under the strictest guidelines should it be
permitted.
In allowing a video surveillance upon nothing less than the
most compelling situation, Judge Keeton struck the proper bal-
ance.10 3 After noting that Title III is inapplicable and that video
surveillance is more intrusive than audio surveillance, the court per-
mitted the video surveillance but only under the most circumscribed
conditions." That is, the court concluded that the video surveil-
lance component could be activated only after it had been deter-
mined by the audio component alone that illegal activities within the
scope of the investigation were taking place. Thus, the court im-
posed the strictest minimization requirement possible required by
99. People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 644-55, 422 N.E.2d 506, 509, 439 N.Y.S.2d
846, 849 (1981).
100. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(c)(3) (1984 & Supp. 1987).
101. Torres: Statutory Regulation, supra note 1I, at 269-70.
Moreover, the privacy interest actually invaded by video surveillance is much
greater than the invasion posed by a Title III interception. The moment one
person speaks with another, he has lost part of the expectation of privacy ac-
corded to the speech. The person spoken to can always relate what he has
heard. On the other hand, when a person believes he is alone, absent any
known observers, he has an absolute expectation of privacy even if engaging in
criminal activity. While electronic eavesdropping may be avoided by maintain-
ing silence, video surveillance is literally inescapable.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
102. 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985).
103. In re Order Authorizing Interception of Oral Communications & Videotape Sur-




Berger-Katz while still allowing the surveillance to take place.' 5
The court in Ricks did not fully meet this minimization require-
ment. While the court order attempted to minimize the video sur-
veillance,' 0 6 it was not drawn as narrowly as Judge Keeton's order
because it did not utilize aural surveillance as a trigger in activating
visual surveillance. 10 7 Perhaps this was because the affidavit alleged
"that the organization's members were so disciplined in their
speech as possibly to result in failure of interception of oral communi-
cations by audio devices.... ."01 Nonetheless, this did not preclude
the police officers who were monitoring the audio devices to activate
the video surveillance when they became reasonably suspicious of
criminal activities. While this does leave some discretion to the po-
lice officers, it permits a less intrusive video surveillance than the
one ordered in Ricks. 109
Notwithstanding these concerns, under existing law the Ricks
surveillance probably was permissible. Indeed, because Title III
and the Maryland Act do not regulate video surveillance, it is within
the realm of the judiciary to determine whether such surveillance is
constitutional. No court has yet held that video surveillance is per
se unconstitutional and because the court of appeals applied the Ber-
ger-Katz standard in a fashion similar to other courts, arguably the
105. Id.
106. Ricks v. State, 312 Md. I1, 30, 537 A.2d, 612, 621 (1988).
Finally, the order required that strict minimization precautions be adhered to
so that communications and activities not otherwise subject to the order, i.e.,
those not drug-related, would not be recorded. Specifically, Judge Allen or-
dered that (I) the camera was to be activated only when someone was in the
apartment; (2) that the camera was to be turned off if it was determined that the
activity did not relate to or was not a prelude to drug activity; (3) that extremely
circumscribed spot monitoring would be allowed only to determine if the activ-
ity related to drugs; and, (4) that any privileged or private communications not
related to drug activities were to be minimized to the maximum extent possible.
Id.
107. In re Order, 513 F. Supp. at 423.
ITlhe application represents that the agents implementing the video surveil-
lance will be directed that the video surveillance component be turned on after
it has been determined from the audio component that communications involv-
ing illegal activities or illegal activity itself, within the scope of the proposed
investigation, is taking place and that the video component remain on only as
long as and under the same constraints as are imposed in oral interception for
the purpose of minimizing the intrusion consistently with the requirements of
Title III.
Id. (emphasis in original).
108. Ricks, 312 Md. at 17, 537 A.2d at 614 (emphasis added).
109. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-59 (1967). Police discretion is problem-




court has followed existing precedent. Nevertheless, more should
be required. The Constitution is not a statute prescribing exact
standards of conduct but is a check upon the abuse of personal free-
doms. Since the Supreme Court appears to be content with the
lower court decisions, the field cries out for legislative guidance.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Ricks the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a court-ordered
surreptitious nonconsensual video surveillance of a private dwelling
by finding that the Maryland Act, like Title III, does not regulate
such conduct and that the fourth amendment standards imposed by
Berger and Katz were met. Based on the interpretations of other ju-
risdictions, the conclusion probably is correct, which makes it all the
more disturbing. The real danger of routine audio and video sur-
veillance is that "every sound, every word, and every gesture-
everything except the targets' unexpressed thoughts"" 0 is subject
to governmental detection. Only under the most compelling circum-
stances, such as immediate risk of death or grievous bodily harm,
should society's safety be found to outweigh the guarantees of free-
dom found in the fourth amendment; the circumstances of the case
should be so compelling as to leave a court no other choice. Yet too
many courts have found this dangerous and most intrusive form of
surveillance permissible under circumstances less compelling than
those necessary for less intrusive electronic surveillance devices.
Therefore, it is up to the legislature to bring order to the field. As
the New York Court of Appeals concluded in Teicher,
The degree of intrusiveness inherent in video electronic
surveillance demands unswerving adherence to each of the
limitations placed upon the use of this device. Moreover,
because the use of this investigative technique poses a
threat to the privacy of citizens, legislative scrutiny of the
field and the enactment of specific guidelines would appear
to be in order."'
The decision in Teicher was written in 1981. It appears such guide-
lines are long overdue.
THOMAS M. MESSANA
110. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 891 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J., concur-
ring in result), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985).
111. People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 656, 422 N.E.2d 506, 515, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846,
855 (1981).
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